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ABSTRACT 
 
Background Knowledge, Category Labels, and Similarity Judgment. (August 2010) 
Na Yung Yu, B.A.; M.A., Pusan National University, Korea 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Takashi Yamauchi 
 
 Labels are one source of our judgments. By assigning labels to objects, we not 
only create references but we also group prior and current experiences together. The goal 
of this research is to investigate how labels influence our judgments. Previous research 
on inductive generalization shows that labels can be more important than physical 
characteristics (the labeling effect), but the mechanism for this effect remains unclear. 
There are two differing views regarding the role of labels. One view proposes that labels 
are not essentially different from physical features: shared labels increase overall 
similarity between two items in the same way as shared physical features. The other 
view suggests that people have a naïve theory that shared labels are more special than 
shared physical features. The goal of this dissertation is to provide evidence that 
complements these conflicting views. I suggest that the role of labels varies depending 
on the background knowledge: types of categories (living things vs. man-made objects), 
amount of knowledge (number of exemplars people could list for the category), and 
types of labels (categorical vs. indexical). The results from four experiments showed 
that, for living things, the labeling effect is strong and depends less on the amount of 
 iv 
knowledge; for man-made objects, the labeling effect is weak and depends on the 
amount of knowledge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ability to generalize is one of the most important aspects of human cognition. 
Research suggests that similarity (Sloman, 1993), category membership (Osherson, 
Smith, Wilkie, López, & Shafir, 1990), and previous experiences (Heit, 1998, 2000) 
influence inductive generalization. For example, when two objects share many features, 
we project an attribute of one stimulus to the other (Rips, 1975). When two items are in 
the same category, we also infer that stimuli would have features in common (Yamauchi 
& Markman, 2000). Prior experiences and background knowledge are also used in 
inductive generalization. If items have been previously observed together, we assume 
that they will occur together in the future.  These assumptions guide our inductive 
learning and allow for coherent and ad-hoc explanations about the world (Murphy & 
Medin, 1985; Rehder & Hastie, 2004; Sloman, 1994).  For example, certain crimes such 
as assault or robbery typically happen in dark alleys. Therefore, people associate danger 
with dark settings, and this assumption leads them to avoid walking alone at night. 
One important issue in inductive generalization is the role of shared category labels. 
When two objects carry the same label, we tend to assume that these objects have some 
important characteristics in common; when objects carry different labels, we tend to 
presume that they have some distinctive characteristics (i.e., labeling effect). Much 
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research has suggested that the strong tendency to use labels for generalization emerges 
early in infancy (DeLoache, 2004; Keates & Graham, 2009; Lupyan, Rakison, & 
McClelland, 2007; Waxman & Braun, 2005; Waxman & Markow, 1998) and spans 
across cultures (Lόpez, Atran, Coley, Medin & Atran, 2004; Roberson, Davies, & 
Davidoff, 2000; Saalbach & Imai, 2007). 
How do labels influence our judgments? One view suggests that categorical 
labels (i.e., labels that present categories of instances) have a special status in inductive 
generalization (Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Murphy, 2003; Yamauchi & 
Markman, 2000; Yamauchi, 2009; Yamauchi & Yu, 2008): people believe that shared 
categorical labels indicate groups of things (Gelman & Markman, 1986; Waxman & 
Braun, 2005) and that categorical labels are qualitatively different from physical features 
(Yamauchi & Markman, 2000). The other view argues that there is nothing special about 
the labels (Anderson, 1990; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; Sloutsky, Kloos, & Fisher, 2007): 
the matching categorical labels contribute to the overall similarity in the same way as 
matching physical features. Evidence from both views demonstrates the strong tendency 
to use categorical labels in inductive generalization; however, they differ on the extent to 
which these labels are used in inductive generalization. 
In this dissertation, I investigate the role of category labels in inductive 
generalization. The goal is to incorporate background knowledge and complement these 
two opposing views. In four experiments, I manipulated three types of knowledge from 
which the labeling effect may originate– types of categories (e.g., living things and man-
made objects, Warrington & Shallice, 1984), the amount of knowledge (how much 
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people know about a given category; Heit, 1998, 2000) and types of labels (labels for 
category membership vs. labels for single items; Rhemtulla & Hall, 2008; Waxman & 
Markow, 1995).  I propose that the labeling effect stems from the interaction among 
these three factors.  
In the following section, I briefly review two major claims regarding the role of 
labels in inductive generalization. Then, I review previous research on the role of 
background knowledge in inductive generalization. This review will show that the link 
between category labels and background knowledge requires further exploration.  
Role of Labels in Inductive Generalization 
Why do people use labels to make inductive judgments? The naïve theory view 
states that people tend to make a naïve assumption that category labels are qualitatively 
different from physical features (Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Gelman & 
Waxman, 2007; Keates & Graham, 2009; Lupyan, 2008; Murphy, 2003; Waxman & 
Braun, 295; Yamauchi, 2005; Yamauchi, Kohn & Yu, 2007; Yamauchi & Markman, 
2000a; Yamauchi & Yu, 2008; see also Markman & Ross, 2003 for discussion). A wide 
range of developmental studies showed that when children were presented with 
physically dissimilar stimuli that shared the same label, they assumed that similar 
features existed among those stimuli (Gelman & Coley, 1990; Gelman & Heyman, 1999; 
Jaswal, 2007; Keates & Graham, 2009; Özçalişkan, Goldin-Meadow, Gentner, & 
Mylander, 2009; Rhemtulla & Hall, 2008; Waxman & Booth, 2001; Waxman & 
Markow, 1995). For example, Gelman and Markman (1986) investigated children’s 
inductive judgments while physical similarity of stimuli was pitted against category 
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membership, which was depicted by having the same category labels (Figure 1a). 
Participants in their study were presented with three line drawings: a target at the bottom 
and two base pictures at the top (Figure 1a). One base picture was dissimilar in 
appearance to the target, but shared the same label (“fish”) as the target. The other base 
picture was similar to the target but was shown with a different label (“dolphin”). Four 
to five-year-old children judged that the target and the dissimilar base would breathe in 
the same way because they share the label “fish.”  This result suggests that young 
children base their inductive generalization on shared category labels without relying on 
physical features. 
Adult studies further demonstrated that people rely on shared category labels 
when the shared category labels indicate shared category membership (Yamauchi, 2009; 
Yamauchi et al., 2007; Yamauchi & Markman, 2000a; Yamauchi & Yu, 2008). In their 
study, the matching label (e.g., monek) indicated either category membership (e.g., both 
are monek) or feature information (e.g., both eat monek). Adult participants used the 
label that represented category membership more than the labels that indicated feature 
information. Their further analysis showed that participants viewed the shared category 
labels more often than physical features, and the participants viewed the labels in earlier 
stages of inductive generalization (Yamauchi, Kohn & Yu, 2007). Studies have 
demonstrated that category membership information is important in inductive 
generalization (Heit & Heyes, 2005; Kaminski, Sloutsky, & Heckler, 2008; Malt, Ross 
& Murphy, 1995; Murphy & Ross, 1994; Ross & Murphy, 1996), which may explain 
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why people first categorize stimuli based on shared category labels.  
The other dominant view, however, argues that there is no indication that people 
have such a naïve theory about category labels (Anderson, 1990; Fisher & Sloutsky, 
2005; Napolitano & Sloutsky, 2004; Robinson & Sloutsky, 2004; Sloutsky & Fisher, 
2004a, 2004b; Sloutsky, Kloos, & Fisher, 2007; Sloutsky & Spino, 2004). According to 
this view, referred to here as the similarity-based approach, matching labels increase the 
perception of overall similarity just like matching physical features. For example, when 
two pictures have the matching physical features (e.g., both animals are white), people 
perceive the two pictures as similar (Tversky, 1977). Likewise, when the pictures carry 
the matching labels (e.g., both are called “Lolo”), people perceive the two pictures as 
Figure 1. Sample trials from previous studies. (a) Sample trial from the study by 
Gelman and Markman (1986); (b) sample trial from the study by Sloutsky and Fisher 
(2004a). 
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similar.  
Sloutsky and Fisher (2004a) adopted a triad task similar to the one used by 
Gelman and Markman (1986) and corroborated this claim. In their study, 4 to 5-years-
olds were presented with a target on the top and two base pictures at the bottom using 
labels that were pitted against the physical similarity (Figure 1b). Participants judged 
whether the target was more likely to have blue blood, like the similar base picture with 
the different label, or green blood, like the dissimilar base picture with the same label. 
They found that children judged that the target would have green blood like the 
dissimilar base picture because it shared the label “Lolo.” Sloutsky and Fisher created a 
computational model where labels and physical features did not qualitatively differ; 
though they assigned larger attention weights for the labels than for the physical features 
(but also see Heit & Hayes, 2005). They argue that labels are not special because their 
model shows that people evaluate matching labels as a type of matching feature that 
increases the overall similarity of items.  
In both the naïve theory and the similarity-based approaches, category labels are 
expected to influence inductive generalization, but the naïve theory approach specifies 
that labels are used to form assumptions, while the similarity-based approach suggests 
that labels are used as a type of feature. In the following section, I review the research on 
three types of background knowledge and suggest that this knowledge can complement 
the naïve theory approach and the similarity-based approach. 
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Research on Three Types of Background Knowledge 
Research has shown the influence of background knowledge in many aspects of 
inductive generalization (Ahn, 1998; Coley, Hayes, Lawson & Moloney, 2004; Heit, 
1998, 2000; Heit & Rubinstein, 1994; Heyes & Thompson, 2007; Keil, 1989; Medin, 
Coley, Storms, & Hayes, 2003; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rehder, 2006; Wattenmaker, 
Dewey, Murphy, & Medin, 1986; Wisniewski & Medin, 1994). The goal of this study is 
to address the link between background knowledge and the labeling effect.  
Types of categories. Studies of patients suffering from semantic dementia suggest 
that people may organize background knowledge based on the types of categories such 
as living things versus man-made objects. Patients who had bilateral damage to the 
temporal limbic system often could not recognize pictures of living things (e.g., animals, 
plants), but they could name pictures of man-made objects (e.g., tools, towels) (Damasio, 
Grabowski, Tranel, Hichwa & Damasio, 1996; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Warrington & 
Shallic, 1984). The opposite pattern of dissociation for these two types of categories was 
also observed for patients with damage to the frontoparietal region. These patients could 
not recognize pictures of man-made objects, whereas they could name living things 
(Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992; Warrington & McCarthy, 
1983). This dissociation suggests that living things and man-made objects are organized 
differently, each involving separate brain regions (for review, see Caramazza & Shelton, 
1998; Moss, Tyler, Durrant-Peatifield & Bunn, 1998).  
The distinction between living things and man-made objects is also shown in 
developmental research. Children’s understanding of living things relies on internal 
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features (e.g., DNA and maturation), while their understanding of man-made objects 
relies on external features (e.g., physical appearances; Barton & Komatsu, 1989; Carey, 
1985; Chao, Chen, Roisman, & Hong, 2007; Hong, Chao, & No, 2009; Keil, 1989; 
Medin & Ortony, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rips, 1989; Wattenmaker, 1995; for 
review, see Medin, Lynch & Solomon, 2000; Rips, 2001). For example, participants in 
the Rips (1989) study were presented with a story of an animal called “sob” that 
originally looked like a bird but changed to look like an insect. When the transformation 
in appearance was explained as a result of maturation (internal feature), they thought that 
the transformed animal was no longer a sob. In a control condition, when the 
transformation in appearance was due to chemical hazards, participants judged that the 
transformed animal was still a sob. Physical appearance was considered an important 
factor for judgments about living things only when it was caused by internal features. 
These results suggest that, for living things, physical appearances are not always 
considered important. 
Amount of knowledge. Although studies have showed that experts form inductive 
generalizations differently than novices (e.g., Johson & Mervis, 1997), the amount of 
knowledge that novices have has not been well explored in the research on the labeling 
effect. The main reason is the difficulty of quantifying “background knowledge.” In the 
similarity-based approach, similarity between items is quantitatively measured by 
counting the number of matching and mismatching features between two items (Tversky, 
1977), and the measured similarity is used to explain the pattern of inductive 
generalization (e.g., Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004a; Osherson et al., 1990). Although the 
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models of inductive generalization have tried to quantify background knowledge, the 
knowledge was measured in terms of similarity (Heit, 1998, 2000; McDonald, Samuels, 
& Rispoli, 1996; Smith, Shafir, & Oshersonat, 1993; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001). In 
Heit’s Bayesian model of inductive generalization (1998, 2000), for example, prior 
knowledge of two items was measured based on the matching/mismatching features that 
people already knew for the items, and this measured prior knowledge was used to 
explain the pattern of inductive generalization. Since background knowledge was 
measured in the same way as similarity, a method that quantifies background knowledge 
differently than similarity should be tested.  
One way to measure the amount of background knowledge is to ask participants 
to list as many exemplars of a category as possible (Barsalou, 1985; Smith, Ward, 
Tindell, Sifonis, & Wilkenfeld, 2000; Ward, Patterson, Sifonis, Dodds, & Saunders, 
2002). Smith and colleagues (2000) asked a group of participants to list as many 
exemplars that they could think of for 10 different categories (e.g., birds). The 
researchers also asked a second group of participants to study words (e.g., eagle, 
flamingo) that belong to the same 10 categories and then recall the words they studied. 
Smith et al found that people falsely recollected nonpresented items (e.g., sparrow) that 
were also the exemplars that the first group of participants frequently listed. Their study 
demonstrates that the frequently listed members have greater accessibility within the 
category, and this conceptual knowledge influences false memory. Given that the 
amount of background knowledge influences false memory, it is also possible that the 
amount of background knowledge influences inductive generalizations. 
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Types of labels. Studies suggest that categorical labels (labels representing 
category membership) guide inductive generalization even when they are pitted against 
physical similarity (Gelman & Coley, 1990; Özçalişkan et al., 2009; Rhemtulla & Hall, 
2008; Waxman & Booth, 2001; Waxman & Markow, 1995; Yamauchi, 2005; Yamauchi 
et al., 2007; Yamauchi & Markman, 2000; Yamauchi & Yu, 2008; Yu, Yamauchi, & 
Schumacher, 2008). Children used noun labels that depicted category membership more 
than adjective labels (Waxman & Booth, 2001) or verb labels (Gelman & Heyman, 
1999) in inductive generalizations (Özçalişkan et al., 2009; Rhemtulla & Hall, 2008). 
Gelman and Heyman (1999) found that when someone was described with a noun label 
(e.g., Linda is a carrot eater), children assumed that the described characteristic was 
more stable over time and context than the characteristic described with a verb label (e.g., 
Linda eats carrots a lot). This results suggests that young children can distinguish 
between syntactic cues associated with labels (e.g., nouns and verbs) in order to 
understand category membership.  
Given that the labeling effect only occurs for certain types of labels (e.g., 
categorical labels), it is problematic to compare studies that use different types of labels. 
Although the overall settings of the tasks in Gelman and Markman (1986) and Sloutsky 
and Fisher (2004a) were identical (Figure 1a and 1b), the types of labels were different. 
Gelman and Markman (1986) presented pictures with real animal labels such as “fish” 
and “dolphin.” Because participants already knew these labels, they could think of many 
exemplars of these categories. In contrast, Sloutsky and Fisher (2004a) showed pictures 
with novel, arbitrary names such as “Lolo” and “Tippy” (i.e., indexical labels). Because 
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participants could not think of other exemplars of “Lolo” or “Tippy,” they could have 
relied less on these labels. The discrepancy between these two studies might be partly 
due to types of labels: it is possible that indexical labels are considered to be another 
matching feature while categorical labels are considered to be more important than 
matching physical features.  
This review suggests that the influence of the labels can be based on three types 
of background knowledge: types of categories (e.g., living things vs. man-made objects), 
amount of knowledge (e.g., listed exemplars of a category), and types of labels 
(categorical labels vs. indexical labels). I hypothesize that the labeling effect is stronger 
for living things than for man-made objects, stronger for the categories for which people 
have more background knowledge, and stronger for categorical labels than for indexical 
labels. In the following four experiments, I manipulated these factors and tested these 
hypotheses.  
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EXPERIMENT 1: SIMILARITY JUDGMENT TASK 
Experiment 1 employed a similarity judgment task to demonstrate the labeling 
effect with an experimental setting that has been used in previous studies (Gelman & 
Markman, 1986; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004). However, different questions were used in 
this experiment. The questions used in the studies by Gelman and Markman (1986) and 
Sloutsky and Fisher (2004a) may be one reason for their different results (Figure 1). 
Gelman and Markman used more realistic questions, such as whether the target breathes 
like a fish or a dolphin; whereas Sloutsky and Fisher used less realistic questions, such 
as whether the target has green blood or blue blood (Figure 1). The type of questions can 
be one confound in these studies.  
The goal of Experiment 1 is to examine the effect of labels while controlling for 
the type of questions. Instead of having participants answer realistic/unrealistic questions, 
participants in Experiment 1 were asked to judge the similarity of animal faces (Figure 
2). They were presented with three animal face pictures: a target picture placed at the top 
and two base pictures placed at the bottom (Figure 2a). In each stimulus frame, the target 
was more similar looking to one base picture (“similar base picture”) than to the other 
base picture (“dissimilar base picture”) (Figure 2a). The task was to judge which base 
picture, left or right, is more similar to the target.  
The effect of labels was examined by comparing two conditions: no-label and 
same-label conditions. In the no-label condition, all pictures were presented without 
labels (Figure 2a). In the same-label condition, the dissimilar base picture had the same 
animal label (e.g., “horse”) as the target (Figure 2b). In both conditions, the 
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proportions of participants judging the dissimilar base picture as similar to the target (i.e., 
the proportion of participants judging pictures with the same category labels as similar) 
were recorded. I hypothesize that labels will influence similarity judgments. That is, the 
proportion of participants judging the dissimilar base picture as similar to the target will 
be significantly higher in the same-label condition than in the no-label condition.  
 
 
Figure 2. Sample trials in Experiment 1. In each trial, a target picture was placed 
at the top and two base pictures were placed at the bottom. One base picture was 
less similar to the target (“dissimilar base picture”). In the no-label condition (a), 
pictures were presented without labels. In the same-label condition (b), the target 
and the dissimilar base picture on the bottom right shared the same labels; the 
target and the other base picture on the bottom left had different labels. 
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Method 
Participants. One hundred one undergraduate students participated for course 
credit. They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: no-label (n = 52) and 
same-label (n = 49). 
Materials. In Experiment 1, participants received triads of animal face pictures 
(Figure 2). To create stimuli, five pairs of original animal face pictures were selected. 
Each pair of original animal faces was merged using MorphMan 4.0 (2003) software. 
Altogether, 90 morphed pictures were created from five sets of original pictures (18 
degrees of morphed pictures for each of five pairs; see Appendix A for samples of 
morphed stimuli). 
From the morphed pictures, three levels of physical difference―low-, medium-, 
and high-difference―were created based on the degree of merging of the two original 
pictures (Figure 3). In the low-difference condition, the two base pictures were not very 
different (Figure 3a); in the medium-difference condition, the two base pictures were 
moderately different (Figure 3b); and in the high-difference condition, the two base 
pictures were highly different (Figure 3c). Two sets of base pictures were randomly 
selected at each level of physical difference and were combined with one of two original 
pictures in each pair, yielding 12 triads for each pair (a total of 60 triads = 5 pairs × 12 
triads).  
In each trial, the target was always an original picture, and the two base pictures 
(see Figure 2) were morphed images of two original pictures (see Figure 3).  
15 
 
Figure 3. Three levels of physical difference. The two base pictures were very similar in 
the low-difference condition (a), moderately similar in the medium-difference condition 
(b), and very dissimilar in the high-difference condition (c). 
 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
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Design. Experiment 1 had a 2 (Label Condition; no-label vs. same-label 
conditions; between-subjects) × 3 (Physical Difference; low-difference, medium-
difference, high-difference; within-subjects) factorial design. The dependent measure 
was the proportion of participants selecting the dissimilar base pictures as more similar 
to the target than the other base pictures (Figure 2).  
Procedure. Sixty triads of pictures were presented to participants one at a time in 
the center of the computer screen. Participants were asked to select the base picture that 
they judged to be more similar to the target than the other base picture. They indicated 
their responses by pressing the left or right arrow key on the keyboard. E-Prime 1.1 
(Psychology Software Tools Inc., 2002) was used to present individual trials. The order 
of presented stimuli was determined randomly. The dissimilar base picture was 
presented on the left or the right side an equal number of times. The experiment lasted 
approximately 10 minutes.  
Results and Discussion 
Figure 4 summarizes the main results from Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, 
participants were asked to judge similarity of pictures to control for the effect of type of 
questions while testing for the labeling effect. As predicted, when labels were attached to 
the pictures, similarity judgments of animal face pictures changed considerably. The 
proportion of participants selecting the dissimilar base pictures was significantly higher 
in the same-label condition (M = 0.29) than in the no-label condition (M = 0.15), F (1, 
99) = 28.57, MSE = 0.05, p < .001, η2 = .22 (see also Appendix B).  
17 
 
The interaction between the label condition and the physical difference was also 
significant, F (2, 198) = 15.43, MSE = 0.01, p < .001, η2 = .14. Having the same label as 
the target increased the proportion of participants selecting the dissimilar base picture 
compared with the no-label condition at the low and medium level of physical 
difference: low-difference, t (99) = 5.73, SE = .04, p < .01, d = 1.14; medium-difference, 
t (99) = 4.20, SE = .04, p < .01, d = .84. However, at the high level of physical difference, 
the difference between the same-label condition and no-label condition did not reach the 
significance level after Bonferroni adjustment; high-difference, t (99) = 2.22, SE = .04, p 
= .03, d = .44.  
Figure 4. Mean proportions of participants selecting the dissimilar base picture (that 
carried the same label as the target) over the other base picture in Experiment 1. The 
error bars represent two standard error units calculated from each condition. 
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The labels influenced inductive judgments when the type of question was 
controlled. Since all participants carried out the same similarity judgment task, the 
difference between the same-label condition and the no-label condition must have 
stemmed from the labels attached to the pictures. Given that labels alone can influence 
similarity judgment of pictures, Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that the labeling 
effect depends on types of categories (living things vs. man-made objects). I hypothesize 
that category labels influence inductive generalization more for living things than for 
man-made objects.  
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EXPERIMENT 2: TYPES OF CATEGORIES  
The goal of Experiment 2 is to investigate whether the labeling effect is stronger 
for living things than man-made objects. Studies suggest that inductive generalizations 
for living things do not always rely on physical appearances (Gelman, 2003; Rips, 1989), 
while inductive generalizations for man-made objects depend on physical appearances 
(Barton & Kmatsu, 1989; Carey, 1985). Thus, I predict that when labels are pitted 
against physical features for living things, people will use the labels more than when 
labels are pitted against physical features for man-made objects.  
To manipulate the types of categories exclusively with labels, participants in 
Experiment 2 were presented with the same set of animal tissue pictures with labels 
representing living things or man-made objects. Since participants are unlikely to have 
experienced seeing animal tissue pictures (for examples, see Appendix A), and they are 
presented with the same set of pictures in all conditions, the background knowledge 
stems mostly from the labels attached to the pictures.   
Figure 5 shows sample trials of Experiment 2. All subjects received the same 
pictures with labels, except that the meanings associated with the labels were 
manipulated in the instructions. In some cases, the labels represented living things (cells). 
In the animal cell condition, participants were told that the pictures represented animal 
cells and the pictures’ labels described the animal cell names (e.g., “Pig bone cell” in 
Figure 5a). In the diseased cell condition, they were told that the pictures represented 
cells infected by diseases and the pictures’ labels described the disease names (e.g., 
“Epsilersy” in Figure 5b). Thus, in both animal cell and diseased cell conditions, labels 
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represented categories of living things (cells).  
In the other cases, the labels represented man-made objects (paintings, pictures). 
In the painter condition, participants were told that the pictures represented abstract 
paintings, and pictures’ labels described the painters’ names (painter condition, e.g., 
“Dalica” in Figure 5c). In the picture type condition, participants were told that they 
would be shown pictures and the labels described the picture types (e.g., “Type D” in 
Figure 5. Sample trials shown in Experiment 2. Labels indicated animal cells in the 
animal cell condition (a), diseases the cells carried in the diseased cell condition 
(b), artists who painted the abstract paintings in the painter condition (c), or picture 
types in the picture type condition (d). 
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Figure 5d). Thus, in both painter and picture type conditions, labels represented 
categories of man-made objects (paintings/pictures). The proportion of selecting 
dissimilar base pictures will be greater when the labels indicate animal cells and diseased 
cells than when the labels indicate paintings and pictures.  
Method 
Participants. Two hundred fifty two undergraduate students participated for 
course credit. They were randomly assigned to one of the five conditions: no-label (n = 
48), animal cell (n = 48), diseased cell (n = 53), painter (n = 56), and picture type (n = 
47). 
Materials. Five pairs of original animal tissue pictures were selected from a well-
known textbook of veterinary histology (Bacha & Bacha, 2000). The procedure of 
creating 60 triads of original and morphed pictures was identical to the procedure 
described in Experiment 1 (see Appendix A for samples of morphed stimuli). As in 
Experiment 1, the triads of pictures had three levels of physical difference (low-, 
medium-, and high-difference).  
Design. The experiment had a 5 (Label Condition; no-label, animal cell, diseased 
cell, painter, picture type conditions; between-subjects) × 3 (Physical Difference; low-
difference, medium-difference, high-difference; within-subjects) factorial design.  
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to the one described in 
Experiment 1. Participants were presented with 60 triads of animal tissue pictures and 
judged which base picture was more similar to the target. 
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Results and Discussion 
Results from Experiment 2 are summarized in Figure 6. As predicted, animal cell 
labels and diseased cell labels significantly influenced similarity judgment of pictures; 
however, picture type labels and painter labels did not influence similarity judgment 
significantly. These results show the influence of types of categories on the labeling 
effect. 
The main effect of the label condition was significant, F (4, 247) = 6.17, MSE = 
0.10, p < .001, η2 = .09. The proportion of participants selecting the dissimilar base 
pictures was significantly higher in the animal cell condition (M = 0.31) and diseased 
cell condition (M = 0.29) as compared to the proportion observed in the no-label 
condition (M = 0.17) after Bonferroni adjustment: animal cell vs. no-label condition, t 
(94) = 3.54, SE = .04, p < .01, d = 0.72, diseased cell vs. no-label condition, t (99) = 3.33, 
SE = .04, p < .01, d = 0.66. However, the proportion of participants selecting the 
dissimilar base pictures was statistically indistinguishable between the no-label condition 
(M = 0.17) and the painter condition (M = 0.18), t (102) = .42, SE = .02, p = .67, d = 0.08, 
as well as between the no-label condition and the picture type condition  (M = 0.20), t 
(93) = 1.23, SE = .02, p < .01, d = 0.25 (see also Appendix B). There was no interaction 
between label condition and physical difference, F (8, 494) < 1.0.  
These results suggest that the labeling effect differs based on the type of 
categories. When labels convey information about living things (e.g., animal cells, 
diseased cells), people use the labels in similarity judgments considerably. However, 
when labels represent information about man-made objects (e.g., paintings, pictures) 
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people do not use the labels in similarity judgments. Since participants received the same 
set of triads of animal tissue pictures, the difference in the labeling effect observed in 
animal cell, diseased cell, picture type and painter label conditions originated in the 
types of categories.  
In Experiment 3, I further examined the impact of knowledge that labels convey. 
Though the type of categories was different between the conditions, other factors such as 
the amount of knowledge and types of labels could have influenced similarity judgments 
(Heit, 1998; Waxman & Markow, 1995; Wisniewski & Medin, 1994). In Experiment 3, I 
tested the labeling effect while manipulating the amount of knowledge and types of 
Figure 6. Mean proportions of participants selecting the dissimilar base picture 
over the other base picture in Experiment 2. The error bars represent two standard 
error units calculated from each condition. 
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labels in addition to the types of categories. 
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EXPERIMENT 3: 
 AMOUNT OF BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE AND TYPES OF LABELS 
The goal of Experiment 3 is to investigate the labeling effect in relation to the 
amount of knowledge and types of labels, in addition to types of categories. The amount 
of knowledge might have been involved in the labeling effect that was found in 
Experiment 2. The results of Experiment 2 showed that people used labels more often 
when they represented animal cells or diseased cells than when they represented picture 
types or painters. In general, however, people may carry more knowledge regarding cells 
versus painters. This difference in the amount of background knowledge could have 
influenced the labeling effect. Experiment 3 directly measured the amount of 
background knowledge and tested this idea.  
Additionally, previous research suggests that when labels represent a group of 
items (category membership), people tend to use categorical labels in inductive 
generalization (Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Waxman & Booth, 2001; Waxman & 
Markow, 1995; Yamauchi et al., 2007; Yamauchi & Markman, 2000). In Experiment 2, 
animal cell labels might have influenced similarity judgments more than painter labels 
because animal cell labels are categorical labels that denote a group of cells (e.g., pig 
bone cell) whereas painter labels are indexical labels that indicate a single painter (e.g., 
Dalica). Experiment 3 tested this idea by comparing the labeling effect of categorical 
labels versus indexical labels.  
Experiment 3 tested whether the labeling effect stems from these three types of 
background knowledge: the type of categories that labels represent (living things vs. 
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man-made objects), the amount of knowledge that labels convey, and the types of labels 
(categorical labels vs. indexical labels). To test these three factors exclusively through 
information carried by labels, the same set of animal tissue pictures were presented to 
participants with the same set of labels (e.g., Dalica, Goyama). The background 
knowledge associated with the labels was solely manipulated through instructions. Since 
all participants were presented with the same trials (Figure 7), the labeling effect in this 
experiment was unambiguously attributed to the effect of the background knowledge 
manipulated through instructions.  
The instructions were manipulated in three ways. The instructions of the diseased 
cell condition and the painter condition were identical to the instructions used 
Figure 7. Sample trial shown in Experiment 3. Participants in all conditions received 
the same set of pictures and labels. The meanings of labels were manipulated mainly 
via instructions. 
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in Experiment 2. In the diseased cell condition, participants were told that the pictures 
were diseased cells and the pictures’ labels were names of diseases. In the painter 
condition, participants were told that the pictures represented paintings and that labels 
referred to the painters’ names. In a third condition (painting style condition), 
participants were also informed that pictures represented paintings but that the labels 
indicated the names of painting styles. In the painter condition, labels were indexical in 
the sense that the label indicated a painter who created the given pictures; however, in 
the painting style condition, labels were categorical because the label represented a 
painting style that could include other paintings that were drawn by many painters in that 
style. After carrying out the similarity judgment task, participants were asked to list as 
many exemplars as possible associated with the categories (diseases, painters, or 
painting styles). The amount of knowledge was measured by counting the number of 
exemplars that each participant generated. 
Method 
Participants. Three hundred and four undergraduates participated for course 
credit. They were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: diseased cell (n = 93), 
painting style (n = 106), and painter (n = 105) conditions.  
Materials. Materials were the same as in Experiment 2. 
Design. The experiment consisted of a 3 (Label Condition; diseased cell, painting 
style, and painter conditions; between subjects) × 3 (Physical Difference; low-difference, 
medium-difference, high-difference; within-subjects) factorial design.  
Procedure. Participants in Experiment 3 were asked to carry out a similarity 
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judgment task identical to that described in Experiment 1 and 2. However, after the 
similarity judgment task, participants in Experiment 3 were asked to list as many 
exemplars that they could think of in 2 minutes. Participants in the diseased cell 
condition were asked to list disease names, participants in the painting style condition 
were asked to list painting style names, and participants in the painter condition were 
asked to list painter names.  
Results and Discussion 
 As in Experiment 2, when the labels indicated living things (diseased cell 
condition), participants used the labels significantly more often than when the labels 
represented man-made things (painter and painter style condition) (Figure 8). The main 
effect of label condition was significant, F(2, 301) = 4.22, MSE = .08, p = .01, η2 = .03. 
The proportion of participants selecting the dissimilar base pictures (the tendency to use 
category labels pitted against physical similarity) was significantly higher in the diseased 
cell condition (M = 0.26) than in the painting style condition (M = 0.21) or the painter 
condition (M = 0.19): diseased cell vs. painting style, t (197) = 2.02, SE = .03, p = .05, d 
= 0.29, diseased cell vs. painter, t (196) = 2.68, SE = .02, p < .01, d = 0.38. The labeling 
effect between the painting style and painter conditions was statistically 
indistinguishable, t (209) = .63, SE = .02, p = .53, d = 0.09. There was no interaction 
effect of physical difference and label condition, F(2,392) < 1.0. 
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Participants had more knowledge about diseases than about painters/painting 
styles. As Figure 9 shows, participants listed more disease names (M = 9.47, SD = 3.72) 
than painting style names (M = 4.64, SD = 2.36) and painter names (M = 3.22, SD = 
2.35), The number of exemplars participants listed for disease names, painting style 
names, and painter names was significantly different from each other, F(2, 301) = 
129.42, MSE = 8.07, p < .01, η2 = .46. More disease names were generated than names 
of painting styles or painter names, diseases vs. painting styles, t (197) = 11.09, SE = .44, 
p = .001, d = 1.58,  diseases vs. painters, t (196) = 14.32, SE = .44, p < .001, d = 2.04.  
Figure 8. Mean proportions of participants selecting the dissimilar base picture over 
the other base picture in Experiment 3. The error bars represent two standard error 
units calculated from each condition. 
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Also, more painting styles were generated than painter names, t (209) = 4.39, SE = .33, p 
< .001, d = 0.60.  
People might have used disease labels more than painter or painting style labels 
because they knew more diseases than painters and painting styles. To test this idea, I 
reanalyzed the data with ANCOVA with the number of exemplars as a covariate. This 
analysis showed that when the amount of background knowledge (i.e., the number of 
exemplars associated with labels) was controlled, the difference between the diseased 
cell, the painting style and painter conditions was reduced: F(2, 300) = 2.84, MSE = .08, 
p = .06, η2 = .02. This analysis indicates that the amount of background knowledge 
Figure 9. The number of exemplars participants listed for diseases, painting styles, 
and painters. X axis represents the number of exemplars; Y axis represents the 
number of participants.  
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influences the effect of types of categories in inductive generalizations.   
To test the relationship between the types of categories and the amount of 
knowledge further, I analyzed the correlation between the number of exemplars and the 
average proportion of selecting dissimilar base pictures separately for living things 
(diseased cell condition) and for man-made objects (painting style condition and painter 
condition). As Figure 10 shows, there was no significant relationship between the 
number of exemplars generated and the proportion of selecting dissimilar base pictures 
for living things (diseased cell condition) (Figure 10a), r(91) = .04, p = .72. To analyze 
the relationship between the number of exemplars and the proportion of selecting 
dissimilar base picture for man-made objects, painter and painting style conditions were 
combined and analyzed. The correlation between the number of exemplars and the 
proportion of selecting dissimilar base pictures was not significant, r(209) = -.07, p = .33, 
though there was a negative (but very weak) relationship between the number of 
exemplars and the proportion of selecting dissimilar base pictures (Figure 10b).  
Though participants in the diseased cell condition generated more exemplars of 
diseases than participants in the painter and painting style conditions, there was no 
correlation between the number of exemplars and the proportion of selecting dissimilar 
pictures (the tendency to use category labels pitted against physical similarity) in the 
diseased cell condition. Although there was an interesting negative (but very weak) 
relationship between the number of exemplars and the proportion of selecting dissimilar 
pictures, this correlation was not significant. This result suggests that for living things 
and man-made objects, participants may use labels relatively independently from the 
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Figure 10. Relationship between the number of exemplars and the proportion of 
participants selecting the dissimilar pictures in the diseased cell condition (a), and 
the painter and painting style conditions (b). 
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amount of knowledge.  
As in Experiment 2, the labeling effect was higher when the labels indicated 
living things (diseased cell condition) than when the labels represented man-made 
objects (painter and painting style conditions). Within man-made objects, the labeling 
effect did not differ between the painting style condition and the painter condition. The 
results suggest that, at least for the man-made objects, categorical labels (painting style 
condition) are not considered more important than indexical labels (painter condition). 
The results also suggest that the impact of the types of categories on inductive 
generalization does not necessarily depend on the amount of knowledge. Though 
participants listed more painting style names than painter names, the labeling effect did 
not differ between these two conditions.  
In Experiment 4, I tested the influence of these three types of knowledge further 
using a different set of stimuli. In Experiment 3, the stimuli in the painting style and 
painter conditions were cell pictures and did not look like paintings; thus it is possible 
that participants did not use the painting labels. Therefore, Experiment 4 tested the effect 
of labels attached to real paintings. 
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EXPERIMENT 4: REAL PAINTINGS 
The main goal of Experiment 4 is to replicate the results of Experiment 3 using a 
different set of pictures (Figure 11). Though participants in the painter and painting style 
conditions of Experiment 3 were instructed that the presented pictures were paintings, 
they might have thought that the pictures were in fact pictures of tissues. Thus, another 
possible explanation for this differential effect of labels is that participants might have 
thought diseased cell labels were more important than painter labels because the pictures 
looked more like cells than paintings. Experiment 4 tested this idea. The design, task, 
and materials in Experiment 4 were identical to Experiment 3, except that real abstract 
paintings were used instead of pictures of animal tissues. 
 
Figure 11. Sample trials shown in Experiment 4. Participants in all conditions received 
the same set of pictures and labels. The meanings of labels were manipulated via 
instructions. 
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Method 
Participants. Three hundred eighty-seven undergraduates participated for course 
credit. They were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: diseased cell (n = 130), 
painting style (n = 121), and painter (n = 136) conditions. 
Materials. Five pairs of abstract paintings were selected from various websites. 
The procedure of creating 60 triads of original and morphed pictures was identical to the 
procedure described in Experiment 1 (see Appendix A for samples of morphed stimuli). 
As in previous experiments, the triads of pictures had three levels of physical difference 
(low-, medium-, and high-difference). 
Design and procedure. The design and procedure in Experiment 4 were identical 
to those used in Experiment 3. Experiment 4 used a 3 (Label Condition; diseased cell, 
painting style, and painter conditions; between subjects) × 3 (Physical Difference; low-
difference, medium-difference, high-difference; within-subjects) factorial design. 
Participants were presented with the same 60 triads of paintings with labels and were 
asked to judge which base picture was more similar to the target. However, participants 
in the diseased cell condition were instructed that the stimuli were cell pictures infected 
by diseases and that the labels specified the names of the diseases that infected the cells. 
Participants in the painting style condition were informed that the stimuli were paintings 
and that the labels indicated the names of painting styles. Participants in the painter 
condition were also told that the stimuli were paintings but that the labels indicated the 
painters’ names. As in Experiment 3, participants were asked to judge similarity of 
pictures and then to list as many exemplars of the category as possible. 
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Results and Discussion 
Results from Experiment 4 replicated the results from Experiment 3. As in 
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, when labels represented living things (diseased cell 
condition), participants used the labels considerably more often than when the labels 
indicated man-made objects (painter and painting style conditions) (Figure 12). The 
main effect of label condition was significant, F (2, 384) = 5.24, MSE = 0.05, p = .006, 
η2 = .03. The proportion of participants selecting the dissimilar base pictures (the 
tendency to use category labels) was significantly higher in the diseased cell condition 
(M = 0.21) than in the painting style condition (M = 0.16) or in the painter 
Figure 12. Mean proportions of participants selecting the dissimilar base picture 
over the other base picture in Experiment 4. The error bars represent two standard 
error units calculated from each condition. 
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condition (M = 0.16): diseased cell vs. painting style, t (249) = 2.30, SE = .02, p = .02, d 
= .29; diseased cell vs. painter condition, t (264) = 2.80, SE = .02, p = .006, d = .34. 
However, the proportion of selecting dissimilar base pictures was not different in the 
painting style condition compared to the painter condition, t (255) = 0.38, SE = .01, p 
= .71, d = .05.  
As in Experiment 3, people had more knowledge of diseases than paintings 
(Figure 13). Participants listed more disease names (M = 9.69, SD = 3.65) than style 
names (M = 4.74, SD = 2.41) and painter names (M = 3.54, SD = 2.67). The number of 
exemplars participants listed for the three conditions were significantly 
Figure 13. The number of exemplars participants listed for diseases, painting styles, 
and painters in Experiment 4. X axis represents the number of exemplars; Y axis 
represents the number of participants.  
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different from each other, F(2, 384) = 159.09, MSE = 8.73, p < .001, η2 = .45. 
Participants listed significantly more disease names than painting style names, t (249) = 
12.20, SE = .41, p < .001, d = 1.54; they generated significantly more disease names than 
painter names, t (264) = 16.27, SE = .38, p < .001, d = 2.00. They also listed 
significantly more painting style names than painter names, t (255) = 3.76, SE = .32, p 
< .001, d = .47. 1  
These results suggest that it is possible that people used disease labels more than 
painter and painting style labels in similarity judgments because they knew more about 
diseases than painters and painting styles. To test this possibility, I reanalyzed the data 
with ANCOVA by controlling the effect of the number of exemplars as a covariate. The 
analysis showed a different result from Experiment 2: when the number of exemplars  
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
1 After the experiment, participants in the diseased cell and painter conditions viewed 10 
original painting stimuli one by one and were asked to estimate the extent to which the 
pictures look like diseased cells or paintings. Participants who received the diseased cell 
condition were asked to estimate the likelihood of each original painting stimulus to be a 
diseased cell. Participants who received the painter condition were asked to estimate the 
likelihood of each original painting stimulus to be a painting. Participants estimated that 
the painting stimuli are likely to be paintings (M = 62.37) more than diseased cells (M = 
48.82), t(221) = 7.84, p < .001.  
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Figure 14. Relationship between the number of exemplars and the proportion 
of participants selecting the dissimilar pictures in diseased cell condition (a), 
and the painter and painting style conditions (b). 
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associated with labels was controlled, the difference between the diseased cell and the 
painter and painting style conditions increased, F(2, 383) = 6.88, MSE = 0.05, p = .001, 
η2 = .04. This analysis indicates that the effect of types of category in inductive 
generalizations is independent from the amount of background knowledge. 
It is possible that the number of exemplars has a different influence on the 
labeling effect with man-made objects (the painter/painting style conditions) compared 
to living things (diseased cell condition) (Figure 14). To test this possibility, I analyzed 
the correlation between the number of exemplars and the average proportion of selecting 
dissimilar base pictures.  The correlation was not significant for living things (Figure 
14a), r(128) = -.04, p = .64. However, for man-made objects (painters, painting styles), 
there was a significant, negative relationship between the number of exemplars and the 
proportion of selecting the dissimilar pictures (Figure 14b), r(255) = -.16, p = .01. For 
man-made objects, participants who could list many exemplars used labels in their 
similarity judgment less often; participants who could list fewer exemplars used labels 
more often.  
The results suggest that the impact of types of categories on the labeling effect 
does not depend on the amount of knowledge. As in Experiment 3, though participants 
in the diseased cell condition generated more exemplars of diseases than participants in 
the painter and painting style conditions, there was no correlation between the number of 
exemplars and the proportion of selecting dissimilar pictures for living things. For man-
made objects, there was a negative correlation between the number of exemplars and the 
proportion of selecting dissimilar pictures. Also within man-made objects, participants 
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generated more painting style names than painter names but the labeling effect between 
these two conditions did not differ.  
The influence of labels on similarity judgments was determined by the 
interaction between types of categories and the amount of knowledge. Participants used 
labels more for living things than man-made objects; however, within the living things, 
the relationship between the amount of knowledge (the number of exemplars) and the 
proportion of selecting dissimilar base pictures was not significant. This result suggests 
that the tendency to use category labels may be relatively independent from the amount 
of knowledge. For man-made objects, however, people who had less knowledge (listed 
fewer exemplars) used the labels more than people who had more knowledge (listed 
many exemplars). This result suggests that for man-made things (paintings or the stimuli 
that were introduced as paintings), the labeling effect depends on the amount of 
knowledge. The types of categories (living things vs. man-made things) and the amount 
of knowledge (the number of exemplars) jointly interact with the tendency to use 
category labels in inductive generalization.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
How are labels used in inductive generalization? In this paper, I suggest that 
people do not always form naïve assumptions or evaluate overall similarity when using 
labels. I propose that the labeling effect is more complicated and is based on the 
interaction between the types of categories and the amount of knowledge.  
Summary of Results 
Altogether, the results suggest that the labeling effect is stronger for living things 
than for man-made objects and depends on the amount of knowledge. In Experiment 1, 
when dissimilar looking animal faces were presented with the same category labels 
(animal names) these pictures were judged to be more similar than when dissimilar 
looking animal faces were presented without labels. Given that the labeling effect was 
replicated in a similarity judgment task in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 investigated the 
influence of the types of categories in the similarity judgment task. Animal tissue 
pictures were presented with category labels and these labels specified that the pictures 
were either living things (animal cells, diseased cells) or man-made objects (abstract 
paintings, pictures). The results demonstrated that labels significantly affected similarity 
judgment more for living things than for man-made objects. Experiment 3 demonstrated 
that, in addition to the types of categories, the amount of knowledge (listed exemplars) 
interacted with the labeling effect. The labeling effect was stronger for living things (e.g., 
diseased cells) than for man-made objects (e.g., paintings); and people generated more 
exemplars for living things than for man-made objects. Using real paintings, Experiment 
4 demonstrated that types of knowledge and the amount of knowledge jointly interacted 
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with the labeling effect.  For man-made objects, the amount of knowledge negatively 
correlated with the tendency to use category labels in similarity judgments; while for 
living things, there was no correlation between the amount of knowledge and the 
tendency to use category labels.  
The results demonstrate that people rely on labels in judgments of living things 
more than in judgments of man-made objects and this tendency is not entirely due to the 
amount of knowledge. For man-made objects, the tendency to use category labels is 
related to the amount of knowledge, while for living things, the tendency to use category 
labels is relatively independent from the amount of knowledge. The results suggest that 
the strong tendency to rely on category labels in inductive generalization is a result of 
the interaction between types of categories and the amount of knowledge. 
Limitations and Future Studies 
The interaction between the amount of knowledge and the types of categories is 
rather limited in two ways. In this study, only diseased cells and animal cells were 
examined as examples of living things, and only paintings and pictures were used as 
examples of man-made objects. A variety of stimuli should be used in future studies that 
test the interaction between the amount of knowledge and types of categories. While it is 
necessary to examine the labeling effect in living things versus man-made objects using 
a variety of stimuli, this will not entirely address the criticism that the type of category is 
not a valid factor in cognitive judgments. This criticism stems from the fact that many 
researchers are skeptical about grouping categories in terms of their contents (Ahn, 
1998; Medin, Lynch, & Solomon, 2000; Rehder, 2003; Rehder, Hastie, 2004; Roberts, 
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2007; Sloman & Malt, 2003). Even though the distinction between living things and 
man-made objects was found and replicated in different aspects of cognitive psychology 
(Barton & Komatsu, 1989; Carey, 1985; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Hong, Chao, & No, 
2009; Keil, 1989; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Warrington & Shallic, 1984), it is difficult to 
have a precise definition of ontological categories, such as living things and man-made 
objects (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). Madin, Lynch and Solomon (2000) correctly 
pointed out that “a fear is that domain-specificity theorists simply define kinds into 
existence by stating a priori that certain kinds of content are important” (p 137). As a 
result, recent research has focused on finding a universal principle that distinguishes 
living things and man-made objects (Ahn, 1998, 2000; Rehder, 2003; Rehder, Hastie, 
2004). However, finding a universal principle is not the main purpose of this current 
study and future studies are needed to address this question further in terms of the 
labeling effect. 
The interaction between the amount of knowledge and types of categories is also 
limited because the amount of knowledge was measured only for the labels. Given that 
the task used in this study involves pictures as well as labels, the amount of knowledge 
of pictures might have contributed to the tendency to use labels in inductive 
generalization. Experiment 4 indirectly addressed this idea by replicating the result of 
Experiment 3 with different stimuli. Experiment 3 showed that when stimuli were cell 
pictures, people used disease labels attached to pictures of cells more than painter and 
painting style labels. In Experiment 4, though the stimuli were real paintings, 
participants still tended to use disease labels more than painter and painting style labels. 
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However, it is still possible that, in Experiment 3, the people who were familiar with 
pictures of cells might have used the cell pictures more than the disease labels to make 
similarity judgments. Future studies should investigate the labeling effect using two 
factors: the amount of knowledge for labels as well as the amount of knowledge for 
pictures.  
Previous studies on the labeling effect demonstrated that when labels indicate 
category membership (labels that represent a group of items) the categorical labels have 
a significant impact on inductive generalization (Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Rhemtulla & 
Hall, 2008; Waxman & Booth, 2001; Waxman & Markow, 1995; Yamauchi et al., 2007; 
Yamauchi & Markman, 2000; Yamauchi & Yu, 2008). However, in this research, there 
was no significant difference between the effect of categorical labels and the effect of 
indexical labels (labels that denote a single exemplar). Given that the effect of 
categorical labels and indexical labels were not compared for living things, this result 
should only be generalized for man-made objects. The results of this study suggest that 
types of labels appeared to have little impact on the labeling effect for man-made things, 
but the role of types of labels for living things needs to be investigated further. 
By definition, a common noun refers to a group of objects, while a proper noun 
designates a particular individual (Kripke, 1980). In this sense, the distinction between 
categorical labels and indexical labels can be viewed such that common nouns and 
proper nouns will generate different labeling effects. The results of this study showed, 
however, that common nouns did not generate a greater labeling effect compared to 
proper nouns. This could be because proper nouns also denote some categorical 
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information. Proper nouns typically originated as expressions that describe individuals 
(Hall, Waxman, Brédart, & Nicolay, 2003) such as one’s job (e.g., Carpenter, Baker), 
places (e.g., Hills, Fields) and desirable qualities (e.g., Faith, Hope). Most proper names 
have lost their major descriptive roles today (e.g., Mr. Carpenter is most certainly not a 
carpenter); however, many proper names serve some descriptive roles such as gender 
(e.g., Diana would not likely be a boy) and family relations (e.g., Edward Jr. would be a 
son of Edward). Additionally, adults are likely to know that a proper noun can be a 
homophone of an adjective (e.g., Lefty as a nickname for left-handed people). Even 
infants as young as 12 months use both proper nouns (e.g., Sib) as well as common 
nouns (e.g., horse) to designate multiple things (Graham, Kilbreath, & Welder, 2004; 
Hall et al., 2003; Jaswal, 2007; Jaswal & Markman, 2007; Waxman & Booth, 2001; 
Waxman & Markow, 1995). These studies suggest that, though the distinction between 
common nouns and proper nouns (i.e., categorical labels and indexical labels) may exist, 
people are still able to use both common and proper nouns to indicate groups of things 
and use them equally in inductive generalization. 
Theoretical Implications 
The goals of this research are to explain the labeling effect by looking at the role 
of background knowledge and to complement the naïve theory and the similarity-based 
approach. Both views explain the labeling effect: people are willing to generalize a 
characteristic of one item to the other item, even when the items look dissimilar but have 
the same category label. However, these two views differ on the role of labels. The naïve 
theory approach suggests that matching labels act as an assumption during the course of 
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induction, whereas the similarity-based approach suggests that matching labels serve as 
a type of shared feature and contribute to overall similarity. 
The naïve theory approach suggests that people treat the shared labels as a type 
of rule. Developmental studies show that young children and infants who have less 
knowledge about the items treat the shared labels as more important than the shared 
similarity (Brown, 1957; Gelman & Coley, 1990; Hall et al., 2003; Jaswal & Markman, 
2007; Rhemtulla & Hall, 2008; Waxman & Booth, 2001; Waxman & Markow, 1995), 
suggesting that young children make the assumption that shared labels indicate shared 
category membership. Later adult studies support this claim by demonstrating that those 
shared labels that indicate the shared category membership are qualitatively different 
from physical features (Yamauchi & Markman, 2000) and are considered in earlier 
stages of inductive generalization (Yamauchi, Kohn & Yu, 2009).  
The similarity-based approach argues that shared labels are just a type of feature. 
In the computational model by Sloutsky and Fisher (2004a), the shared labels and 
physical features were both treated as types of features. By assigning larger attention 
weights for labels than for physical features, the computational model could explain 
children’s tendency to use category labels when they are pitted against physical 
similarity. Recent evidence showed that, for newly learned categories, shared category 
labels did not influence inductive generalization. Children learned to assign category 
labels to drawings of bugs based on one rule (whether the number of legs is greater than 
the number of buttons in each bug). Later, children were asked to perform an inductive 
generalization task (e.g., whether one characteristic of a cartoon bug generalizes to the 
48 
other cartoon bug). They found that the newly learned category labels were not used 
more than physical features (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004a, 2004b; Robinson & Sloutsky, 
2004; Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005; Sloutsky, Kloos & Fisher, 2007).  
The results of this study suggest that the labeling effect is complicated and 
affected by the interaction between types of categories and amount of knowledge. 
Perhaps matching category labels are sometimes used as a type of rule, depending on the 
type of category. Since labels for living things were consistently used more than labels 
for man-made objects, participants might have assigned larger attention weights for 
labels for living things than for man-made objects. Additionally, since the labeling effect 
for living things was relatively independent from the amount of knowledge, participants 
might have been reluctant to change these weights based on the amount of knowledge. 
This suggests that for living things people may instill rules for category labels 
independently from the amount of knowledge. 
For man-made objects, results suggest that people may use category labels as a 
type of feature, for which they can assign different attention weights. When participants 
had more knowledge about paintings, they weighted labels less than physical features in 
their similarity judgments; when they had less knowledge about paintings, they weighted 
labels more than physical features in their judgments. This result suggests that for man-
made objects, people are willing to evaluate the weight of labels and physical features 
based on the amount of knowledge they have.  
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Additional Considerations 
Why do types of categories and the amount of knowledge jointly interact with the 
labeling effect? One possible reason is that the way we experience living things and 
man-made objects may differ. Johnson and Mervis (1997) found that, when compared 
with novices, experts learn to detect more subtle physical features of the actual items for 
living things (e.g., birds). Novices may encounter living things and man-made objects in 
different ways. For example, novices may understand types of diseases and cells through 
naming and describing their characteristics and symptoms, rather than looking at actual 
pictures of cells. On the other hand, novices may understand types of paintings by 
looking at actual paintings rather than by naming and describing characteristics of the 
paintings. The way people experience items in real situations may determine the salience 
of labels in inductive generalization. 
The interaction between the amount of knowledge and types of categories can 
also be due to limited cognitive resources. The category structure of living things is more 
fuzzy and complicated than man-made objects, so that people seek readily available 
information—the shared category labels. Categories of living things have family 
resemblance structure, while categories of man-made objects are often defined by a 
single feature (e.g., function; Coley et al., 2004; Malt, 1990, 1993; Rosch & Mervis, 
1975). Since the category structure of man-made objects is relatively simple and clear, 
participants may be more willing to rely on the amount of knowledge and physical 
features instead of relying on easily accessible information such as the shared category 
label. However, for living things, the category structure is fuzzy so participants may 
50 
choose to use the shared category label as a default heuristic in an attempt to reduce the 
cognitive load to handle inductive generalization (Lagnado & Shanks, 2003; Ross & 
Murphy, 1996; Yamauchi, 2005).  
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CONCLUSION 
Previous research on the labeling effect suggests that people use shared category 
labels as a type of rule or as a type of feature. The present study indicates that 
background knowledge has a critical role in the labeling effect: types of categories and 
the amount of knowledge jointly interact with the labeling effect. Four experiments 
demonstrated that for living things, the labeling effect was strong and relatively 
independent from the amount of knowledge; for man-made objects however, the labeling 
effect was weak and depended on the amount of knowledge. The results suggest that 
people are willing to evaluate shared category labels as a type of feature for man-made 
objects more than for living things.  
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APPENDIX A 
SAMPLE STIMULI 
Appendix A shows sample pictures of stimuli I used in the experiments―animal 
faces, animal tissues, and real paintings. For each pair, one original picture was merged 
with the other original picture in 18 degrees, producing 18 morphed pictures. For each 
pair, two original pictures (a) and four examples of 18 morphed pictures (b) are shown.  
 
Animal face pictures 
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Animal tissue pictures 
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Real paintings 
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APPENDIX B 
ADDITIONAL TABLES 
The mean proportion of participants selecting the dissimilar picture was lower in 
the different-label condition (when the dissimilar picture had a different label from the 
target) compared to the no-label condition replicating the labeling effect observed in 
Experiment 1 (Table B-1) and 2 (Table B-2). 
Table B-1  
Mean proportion of participants selecting the dissimilar picture in Experiment 1. 
No-label Different-label 
Mean  .15 .05 * 
Note. Significance level indicated by * (p < .05) between the no-label condition and the 
different-label condition. 
 
Table B-2 
Mean proportion of participants selecting the dissimilar picture in Experiment 2. 
  No-label Different-label 
    Animal cell Diseased cell Painter Picture type 
Mean 0.17 .12 * .08 * .11 * .16 
Note. Significance level indicated by * (p < .05) between the no-label condition and the 
different-label conditions. 
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